




U.S.-, 91 D.A.R. 7050,
No. 90-709 (June 17, 1991).
Controversy Over Candidate Law Is
Not Ripe for Federal Resolution
In January 1991, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari in this proceed-
ing to determine whether Article II, sec-
tion 6(b) of the California constitution,
which provides that no political party or
party central committee may endorse,
support, or oppose a candidate for non-
partisan office, violates the first and four-
teenth amendments of the federal consti-
tution. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring
1991) p. 185; Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 1990)
p. 189; and Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) p.
139 for extensive background informa-
tion on this case.) Respondents filed suit
in the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California; their third cause
of action challenged section 6(b) on con-
stitutional grounds. The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of
respondents on their third cause of ac-
tion. Although a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals panel reversed, the en banc Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision.
Following oral argument, the Supreme
Court determined that "respondents have
not demonstrated a live controversy ripe
for resolution by the federal courts," va-
cated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and
remanded with instructions to dismiss
respondents' third cause of action. In
support of its finding of nonjusticiability,
the Court found that respondents failed
to demonstrate a live dispute involving
the actual or threatened application of
section 6(b) to bar particular speech. The
Court held that respondents' generalized
claims involved disputes that had be-
come moot by the time respondents filed
suit. Although the Court acknowledged
that "the mootness exception for disputes
capable of repetition yet evading review
has been applied in the election context,"
it held that "that doctrine will not revive
a dispute which became moot before the
action commenced." The Court added
that "[p]ostponing consideration of the
questions presented, until a more con-
crete controversy arises,. . . has the ad-
vantage of permitting the state courts
further opportunity to construe section
6(b), and perhaps in the process to 'ma-
terially alter the question to be decided."'
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
United States v. Montoya,
- F.2d __, 91 D.A.R. 11552,
No. 90-10248 (Sept. 20, 1991).
Former State Senator's Hobbs
Act Convictions Reversed
In 1990, former state Senator Joseph
B. Montoya was convicted of five counts
of extortion and attempted extortion un-
der color of official right in violation of
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. section 1951,
one count of racketeering, and one count
of money laundering. Following his ap-
peal, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed Montoya's Hobbs Act
convictions, and affirmed his convictions
for racketeering and money laundering.
The Hobbs Act provides that a person
is guilty of a crime if he/she "in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any ar-
ticle or commodity in commerce,
by... extortion or attempts or conspires
to do so .. " 18 U.S.C. section 1951 (a).
In reversing Montoya's Hobbs Act con-
victions, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
McCormick v. United States, 111 S.Ct.
1807 (1991), which held that, in order to
establish a Hobbs Act violation, the pros-
ecution must prove that extortionate pay-
ments were "made in return for an ex-
plicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an
official act"-in other words, the pros-
ecution must prove an explicit "quid pro
quo." (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sum-
mer 1991) pp. 204-05 for a summary of
the McCormick case.)
Because of this requirement, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the jury instruc-
tions provided in Montoya's trial were
deficient, noting that a "'new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases pending
on direct appeal."' The court acknowl-
edged that although the jury instructions
provided by the trial court "adequately
took into account existing circuit law at
the time relating to the required element
of inducement," the instructions lacked
McCormick's requirement that the jury
find a "quid pro quo," defined as "'an
explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an
official act."'
However, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Montoya's racketeering and money laun-
dering convictions, rejecting Montoya's
assertion that the "spill-over effect" of
his erroneous Hobbs Act convictions nec-





F2d __,91 D.A.R. 9609,
No. 89-16398 (Aug. 7, 1991).
Conditioning Permits on Fee Payment
Is Not an Unconstitutional Taking
In this proceeding, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Sacramento city ordinance
which conditions certain types of non-
residential building pennits upon the pay-
ment of a fee intended to offset the bur-
dens on the city caused by low-income
workers who move there to fill jobs cre-
ated by the project in question.
In 1987, the City and County of Sac-
ramento commissioned a firm to study
the need for low-income housing, the
effect of nonresidential development on
the demand for such housing, and the
appropriateness of exacting fees in con-
junction with such development to pay
for such housing. Among other things,
the study revealed that nonresidential
development is "a major factor in attract-
ing new employees to the region" and
that the influx of new employees
"create[s] a need for additional housing
in the City." As a result, the City of
Sacramento enacted the Housing Trust
Fund Ordinance in 1989, which imposes
a fee in connection with the issuance of
permits for nonresidential development
of the type that will generate jobs; the
fees are paid into a fund to assist in the
financing of low-income housing.
Commercial Builders challenged the
ordinance, arguing that it constitutes an
unlawful taking and an impermissible
means to advance the legitimate interest
of expanding low-income housing, by
placing the burden of paying for low-
income housing on nonresidential de-
velopment without a sufficient showing
that nonresidential development contrib-
utes to the need for low-income housing
in proportion to that burden. In reject-
ing this contention, the Ninth Circuit
found that the ordinance "was enacted
after a careful study revealed the amount
of low-income housing that would likely
become necessary as a direct result of
the influx of workers that would be as-
sociated with the new nonresidential de-
velopment." The court found that the
"burden assessed against the developers
thus bears a rational relationship to a
public cost closely associated with such
development."
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In dissent, Judge Robert Beezer ar-
gued that "Sacramento's ordinance is a
transparent attempt to force commercial
developers to underwrite social
policy... The Takings Clause prohibits
singling out developers to bear this bur-
den." According to Judge Beezer, "[i]f
Sacramento-has shown a sufficient
causal connection in this case, we can
be expected next to uphold exactions
imposed on developers to subsidize
small business retailers, child-care pro-
grams, food services and health-care de-
livery systems."
In Re Insurance Antitrust Litigation,
_F.2d_, 91 D.A.R. 7172,
-Nos. 89-16405, 89-16513-31
(June 18, 1991).
McCarran Act Immunity Unavailable
To U.S. Insurers Conspiring to Boycott
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has ruled that McCarran Act (15 U.S.C.
section 1011 et seq.) immunity is not
available to American insurers, reinsurers,
and insurance brokers who agreed to boy-
cott nonconforming insurers and engaged
in acts of coercion. The McCarran Act
provides that no act of Congress "shall
be construed to invalidate" any state law
enacted "for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance." The Act fur-
ther provides that the Sherman Act "shall
be applicable to the business of insur-
ance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law" and "[n]othing
contained in this chapter shall render the
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimi-
date, or act of boycott, coercion, or in-
timidation." Thus, for McCarran Act im-
munity to apply, "the defendants must be
in the business of insurance; that busi-
ness must be regulated by state law; and
the defendants must not have agreed to
boycott, coerce, or intimidate or per-
formed an act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."
In 1984, led by Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, a number of primary in-
surers and reinsurers exerted pressure on
the Insurance Service Office (ISO)-an
association of over 1,400 property and
casualty insurers which, among other
things, develops standard policy forms-
to change the standard form for commer-
cial general liability (CGL) insurance.
Specifically, the insurers and reinsurers
sought to eliminate ISO's "occurrence"
form, which insured against occurrences
of liability during the life of a policy, and
replace it with a "claims made" form,
under which only claims made during
the life of a policy would be paid. ISO
subsequently approved a claims made
form with a date after which claims could
not be filed; ISO also continued to offer a
CGL occurrence form. The reinsurer de-
fendants continued to exert pressure on
ISO to eliminate the occurrence form by
announcing that there would be no
reinsurance for primary insurers writing
on the occurrence form and refusing to
renew long-standing reinsurance treaties
with primary insurers unless they agreed
to abandon the occurrence form.
Among other things, the plaintiffs in
this 1988 action (including nineteen states
and a number of private individuals) al-
leged that defendants (including a num-
ber of foreign firms) conspired in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. section
1, to restrict the terms on which
reinsurance would be offered for CGL
risks and to refuse to provide reinsurance
coverage for CGL risks unless ISO agreed
to amend its forms. The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia dismissed plaintiffs' claims be-
cause of the McCarran Act immunity of
the defendants.
In reviewing the standards required
for immunity to attach, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the defendants are in the
business of insurance. However, the court
found that because state insurance
schemes "do not, and could not, purport
to regulate the bulk of international in-
surance transactions," McCarran Act im-
munity does not attach to the foreign
defendants. Thus, domestic defendants
who are subject to state regulation lost
their immunity when they conspired with
the foreign defendants, under the prin-
ciple that the "[m]embership of an ex-
empt entity in a conspiracy with
nonexempt entities makes the exempt
entity liable." Finally, the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs clearly alleged
that defendants attempted to boycott non-
conforming insurers and acts of boycott
and coercion. (See supra agency report
on DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
for related discussion.)
Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. Mohla, et al.,
F.2d -, 91 D.A.R. 11103,
No. 90-35401 (Sept. 11, 1991).
Claim of Abuse of Administrative
and Judicial Process Is Dismissed
In 1988, the Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council (ONRC) filed suit
against the U.S. Forest Service, seeking
to enjoin bidding on a timber contract
for a tract of land in the Mt. Hood Na-
tional Forest. When ONRC learned that
the contract had been awarded to Avison
Timber Company, ONRC amended its
complaint, adding Avison as an indis-
pensable party and seeking to enjoin log-
ging of the land. In February 1989,
Avison filed counterclaims against
ONRC, alleging abuse of administrative
and judicial process and interference
with business relations. The district court
dismissed the counterclaims, finding that
ONRC's claims "involve the exercise of
ONRC's right to petition the courts for
redress against the government and are
therefore protected by the First Amend-
ment" under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
Avison appealed this decision, argu-
ing that Noerr-Pennington protection is
inappropriate, and alleging that ONRC's
suit was part of a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims and that ONRC made
knowing misrepresentations to the court.
Avison contended that ONRC's actions
fell within the "mere sham" exception to
Noerr-Pennington protection, which is
appropriate where "persons use the gov-
ernmental process-as opposed to the
outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon."
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal, noting that where a claim in-
volves the right to petition governmental
bodies under Noerr-Pennington, courts
will apply a heightened pleading stan-
dard; conclusory allegations are not suf-
ficient to strip a defendant's activities of
Noerr-Pennington protection. The court
also found that "Noerr-Pennington pro-
tection is appropriate so long as ONRC
was genuinely seeking governmental ac-
tion." Here, the court held that, in order
to accomplish its goal of preventing any-
one from cutting down the trees on the
land in question, ONRC needed the ac-
tual relief it was requesting from the
courts; "ONRC... was genuinely seek-
ing judicial relief."
Also, the court rejected Avison's bald
allegations that ONRC "knowingly pre-
sented misrepresentations to the court,"
holding that the heightened pleading stan-
dard involved "would have no force if in
order to satisfy it, a party could simply
recast disputed issues from the underly-
ing litigation as 'misrepresentations' by
the other party." The court thus concluded
that "Avison's allegations of misrepre-
sentation are therefore insufficient to
overcome Noerr-Pennington protection."




Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court
of Sacramento County
(State of California,
et al., Real Parties In Interest),
Cal. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 8952,
No. S014461 (July 22, 1991).
Governor's Schedules and Calendars
Are Exempt from Public Disclosure
In a 4-3 decision, the California Su-
preme Court held that former Governor
George Deukmejian's daily, weekly, and
monthly appointment calendars and
schedules are exempt from public dis-
closure under the California Public
Records Act, Government Code section
6250 et seq.
In 1988, a Los Angeles Times reporter
made a Public Records Act request, seek-
ing the Governor's "appointment sched-
ules, calendars, notebooks and any other
documents that would list [the
Governor's] daily activities as governor
from [his] inauguration in 1983 to the
present." The Governor's legal affairs
secretary responded that the records re-
quested were exempt from disclosure
under Government Code section 6254(1),
which provides that "[c]orrespondence
of and to the governor or employees of
the governor's office" is exempt from
public disclosure.
The Times filed suit, seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief to obtain dis-
closure of the materials requested. In op-
position, the Governor claimed that (1)
the records came within the correspon-
dence exemption of section 6254(1); (2)
release of his appointment calendars and
schedules would inhibit the free and can-
did exchange of ideas necessary to the
decisionmaking process; and (3) release
of his appointment calendars and sched-
ules would create a risk to his personal
security.
The California Supreme Court re-
jected the Governor's first argument,
holding that the term "correspondence,"
as used in section 6254(1), refers to
"communication by letters" and that the
"Governor's appointment calendars and
schedules plainly do not meet this
definition."
However, the court found merit in the
Governor's second argument, finding that
"[d]isclosing the identity of persons with
whom the Governor has met and con-
sulted is the functional equivalent of re-
vealing the substance or direction of the
Governor's judgment and mental pro-
cesses; such information would indicate
which interests or individuals he deemed
to be of significance with respect to criti-
cal issues of the moment. The intrusion
into the deliberative process is patent."
Although the court acknowledged that
disclosure of the Governor's itinerary
would have positive public benefits, such
as revealing "whether the Governor was,
in fact, receiving a broad range of opin-
ions, and ultimately whether the state's
highest elected officer was attending dili-
gently to the public business," it deter-
mined that disclosure of such informa-
tion was impractical in light of the nature
of the deliberative process, and found
that "the public interest in nondisclosure
clearly outweighs the public interest in
disclosure."
Further, the court found merit in the
Governor's final argument relating to
personal safety, noting that "it is plau-
sible to believe that an individual intent
on doing harm could use such informa-
tion to discern activity patterns of the




Yoshisato v. Superior Court of
Orange County,
Cal. App. 3d_, 91 D.A.R. 9594,




The Fourth District Court of Appeal
has determined that section 10 of Propo-
sition 115, the omnibus Crime Victims
initiative approved by the voters at the
June 1990 election, conflicts with sec-
tion 16 of Proposition 114, a measure
receiving a greater number of votes at
the same election. The court found that
those sections of the two initiatives sought
to amend Penal Code section 190.2,
which enumerates the special circum-
stances which may subject a defendant
convicted of first degree murder to capi-
tal punishment. Specifically relevant to
the Yoshisato trial, Proposition 115 made
rape with a foreign instrument a special
circumstance mandating either the death
penalty or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole; Proposition 114 did
not contain this provision in its amend-
ments to section 190.2. Proposition 115
also contained a number of other amend-
ments to section 190.2 which were not
contained in Proposition 114's amend-
ments to section 190.2.
The court resolved the conflict be-
tween the two provisions by noting that
article II, section 10(b) of the California
constitution provides that "[i]f the provi-
sions of 2 or more measures approved at
the same election conflict, those of the
measure receiving the highest affirma-
tive vote shall prevail." The court con-
cluded that because Proposition 114 re-
ceived more votes than Proposition 115,
"[n]one of Proposition 115's proposed
amendments to section 190.2 ever took
effect."
Montez v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County,
-Cal. App. 3d-, 91 D.A.R. 10559,
No. B052892 (Aug. 27, 1991).
Proposition 115's Preliminary Hearing
Hearsay Provision Does Not
Prevent Fair Trial
The Second District Court of Appeal
has upheld a provision of Proposition
115 which authorizes the use of hearsay
evidence at preliminary hearings. Under
Proposition 115, hearsay evidence is ad-
missible at a preliminary hearing when a
properly qualified law enforcement offi-
cer testifies concerning "statements of
declarants made out of court offered for
the truth of the matter asserted."
In this proceeding, the defendant was
accused of burglary. At the preliminary
hearing, the accusations were read by a
police detective, based on information
supplied by another officer at the scene
of the crime and two neighbors who saw
the defendant loitering in the area. In this
appeal, the defendant contended that the
use of hearsay violates the federal and
state constitutions, and that the use of"multiple level hearsay" is not sanctioned
by Proposition 115 or any other law.
The Second District rejected the
defendant's constitutional challenges to
the provision, declaring that the U.S. Su-
preme Court "has repeatedly emphasized
that the right to cross-examine is princi-
pally a trial right and has never found a
violation of the Sixth Amendment out-
side of the context of a criminal trial or a
juvenile delinquency proceeding which
was the functional equivalent of a trial.
Moreover, recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have emphasized
that so long as the trier of fact has an
opportunity to see the witnesses subjected
to cross-examination, that the minimum
requirements of the Sixth Amendment
are satisfied." The court also found that
"on no occasion has [the California] Su-
preme Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right of confrontation is applicable
to a preliminary examination." Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that "the use
of hearsay evidence in defendant's pre-
liminary examination does not violate
defendant's right to confront the
witnesses against him."
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Regarding defendant's objection to
the use of "multiple level hearsay," the
court acknowledged that the testimony
in question did constitute "multiple level
hearsay," but found that "[d]efendant's
argument that such hearsay is inadmis-
sible is without merit." The court held
that no applicable law indicates that only
so-called "first level hearsay" is admis-
sible at the preliminary examination,
and that the "voters did not approve an
initiative containing language which
contains the limitations on the use of
hearsay defendant argues exists."
Rebney, et al., v. Wells Fargo Bank,
-Cal. App. 3d-, 91 D.A.R. 9429,
No. A041869 (July 31, 1991).
Formal Findings Are Not Required
For Order Allocating Attorney Fees
In this proceeding, the First District
Court of Appeal held that on a motion
for attorney fees in a class action litiga-
tion, the trial court need not issue a
statement of decision under Code of
Civil Procedure section 632; the record
need only indicate that fees were
awarded under the "lodestar" or "touch-
stone" method. The issue arose follow-
ing the allocation of attorney fees upon
settlement of a class action litigation
arising from the assessment of various
checking account fees by Wells Fargo
Bank and Crocker National Bank. Un-
der the terms of the settlement, $3.4
million was to be divided among nu-
merous attorneys, including counsel for
the class representatives ("class coun-
sel") and appellant Manuel Abascal, who
represented a group of objectors to the
settlement. A court-appointed referee
denied Abascal's request for an
evidentiary hearing on the fee question
and for discovery of a variety of docu-
ments. The referee subsequently
awarded approximately $2.28 million
to class counsel, $170,000 to Abascal,
and the remainder to other attorneys.
Following a motion by Abascal for
judicial review of the referee's order,
the trial court issued a statement of de-
cision and order, in which the court
reduced class counsel's award to $2.197
million, increased Abascal's award to
$188,000, and adjusted several of the
awards to other counsel. The statement
of decision explained that the attorney
fees were awarded according to the
"lodestar" or "touchstone" approach, in
which the court calculates base amounts
from a compilation of time spent and
reasonable hourly compensation of each
attorney and then may adjust the base
amounts in light of various factors. The
court also approved the referee's denial
of further discovery and an evidentiary
hearing, concluding that those measures
were unnecessary.
On appeal, Abascal argued that the
court's statement of decision was inad-
equate because it did not address dis-
puted legal and factual issues, and con-
tended that Code of Civil Procedure
section 632 requires that "upon the trial
of a question of fact by the court," and
on party request, the court "shall issue a
statement of decision explaining the fac-
tual and legal basis for its decision as to
each of the principal controverted is-
sues at trial." In rejecting Abascal's ar-
guments, the First District stated that
the record need only show that attorney
fees were awarded according to the
"lodestar" or "touchstone" approach.
The court found that the trial court's
statement of decision satisfied this mini-
mal requirement, as it expressly stated
that the court had awarded fees based
on the lodestar approach.
The court further noted that "[e]ven
if Code of Civil Procedure section 632
did apply, Abascal waived any error by
failing to bring the claimed defects to
the attention of the trial court after issu-
ance of the statement of decision," based
on the principle that "it would be unfair
to allow counsel to lull the trial court
and opposing counsel into believing the
statement of decision was acceptable,
and thereafter to take advantage of an
error on appeal although it could have
been corrected at trial."
Finally, Abascal contended that the
referee and trial judge erred in denying
discovery on the attorney fee question.
The First District found merit in this
argument as it related to Abascal's con-
tentions that class counsel were double-
billing (being compensated for the same
work in both the present case and a
similar proceeding involving the Bank
of America). The court noted that class
counsel convinced the referee to "take
our word for it" that there would be no
double-billing, and found that "[w]ithin
the context of this litigation, it would
have been unreasonable for the referee
to do so." The court thus ruled that the
referee erred to the extent he denied
discovery to investigate the possibility
of double-billing. However, the court
concluded that the error was shown to
be harmless in light of the time records
ultimately produced in the Bank of
America attorney fee proceeding, which
indicated that almost none of the time
billed in the Wells Fargo litigation was
later billed again to the Bank of America
case. As a result, the First District af-
firmed the trial court's order allocating
attorney fees.
Angelheart v. City of Burbank,
Cal. App. 3d-, 91 D.A.R. 8754,
No. B046173 (July 18, 1991).
Fee Award Is Rejected for Case
Conferring Private Benefits
In this proceeding, plaintiffs success-
fully challenged the City of Burbank's
former regulation of large family day
care homes, which violated the Califor-
nia Child Day Care Facilities Act, Health
and Safety Code section 1596.70 et seq.
As a result of plaintiffs' action, the trial
court issued a peremptory writ of man-
date commanding the city to establish a
procedure for regulating large family
day care homes which complies with
the Act; Burbank subsequently enacted
such an ordinance pursuant to the writ.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5, plaintiffs filed motion
for attorneys' fees and costs totalling
$71,286.62; after hearing on the mo-
tion, the trial court awarded plaintiffs
attorneys' fees in the amount of$18,700.
Both parties appealed this order.
The California Child Day Care Fa-
cilities Act states that "[i]t is the public
policy of this state to provide children
in a family day care home the same
home environment as provided in a tra-
ditional setting." The legislature further
declared "this policy to be of statewide
concern with the purpose of occupying
the field to the exclusion of municipal
zoning, building and fire codes and regu-
lations governing the use or occupancy
of family day care homes for chil-
dren .. " Based on this language, the
Second District found that "the trial court
reasonably could have determined that
the action involved an important right
affecting the public interest."
However, section 1021.5 also re-
quires that "a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, [be]
conferred on the general public or a
large class of persons" as a result of the
underlying action. Regarding this ele-
ment, the Second District found "no
evidence in the record to support the
trial court's conclusion that all of the
residents of Burbank seeking child care
benefitted from the action .... There is
no evidence that he Angelhearts' ac-
tion, although successful and involving
an important public policy, affected a
large class of persons." Because the
court found that "the trial court abused
its discretion in finding the existence of
one of the necessary statutory elements
under section 1021.5," it determined that
there was no basis for an award of fees
and reversed the trial court's order.
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In dissent, Judge Johnson wrote that
"it would place an intolerable burden
on plaintiffs to require them to 'prove'
how many people will take advantage
of the legal change they have brought
about at a time shortly after the change
has occurred .... It was entirely reason-
able for the trial court to predict there
would be enough 'large' home child
care facilities created in Burbank in fu-
ture years to estimate plaintiffs' legal
action eventually will confer 'signifi-
cant benefits' on a large number of
Burbank citizens-children, parents,
employers, and other citizens." Further,
Judge Johnson wrote that "[tlhis is a
particularly appropriate case in which
to require a local government to pay the
plaintiffs' full attorney fees," noting that
"by its very nature, the home child care
field has no large 'chain' operations"
which could bear the financial burden
of challenging the city's regulation.
"What this means, of course," wrote
Judge Johnson, "is that were it not for
the private attorney general doctrine
codified in section 1021.5 city govern-
ments like Burbank could ignore state
laws when the only ones affected by
those laws are small businesses or mod-
est income citizens like the
Angelhearts."
On October 25, the California Su-
preme Court denied the Angelhearts'
petition for review.
Huening v. Eu,
_Cal. App. 3d-, 91 D.A.R. 7768,
No. C008543 (June 25, 1991).
Enactment Without Two-Thirds Vote
Renders Ballot Argument Law Invalid
The Third District Court of Appeal
has determined that Elections Code sec-
tion 3564.1 "is invalid and of no force
or effect because its enactment did not
comply with the procedure specified in
the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov-
ernment Code section 81000 et seq.)."
Section 3564.1, which was added to the
Elections Code in 1978, provides that
"[a] ballot argument or a rebuttal argu-
ment which includes in its text the name
or title of a person, other than the author
of the argument, who is represented as
being for or against a measure, shall not
be accepted unless the argument is ac-
companied by a signed consent of that
person." Opponents to Proposition 119,
which appeared on the June 5, 1990
primary election ballot, attempted to in-
clude in the ballot pamphlet a statement
reflecting the fact that the Chevron Cor-
poration had contributed $25,000 to the
committee supporting Proposition 119.
Because the opponents had not obtained
written consent to use Chevron's name,
Proposition 119 proponents obtained a
writ of mandamus ordering that the chal-
lenged portion of the rebuttal argument
be deleted from the ballot pamphlet.
In this appeal, opponents argued that
section 3564.1 purports to amend the
Political Reform Act by restricting what
may be included in a ballot argument,
and that the Act requires that its provi-
sions be amended by two-thirds vote of
the legislature or by a vote of the elec-
torate. The Attorney General acknowl-
edged that section 3564.1 was enacted
by the legislature but not with the con-
currence of at least two-thirds of the
membership of each house; however,
the Attorney General contended that sec-
tion 3564.1 was not an amendment to
the Political Reform Act because the
Act does not regulate the content of
ballot arguments.
The court rejected the Attorney
General's contentions, finding that
"[allthough section 3564.1 is not con-
tained within the provisions of the Po-
litical Reform Act itself, it is effectively
an addition to it. Its effect on ballot
arguments and hence the content of bal-
lot pamphlets is the same as if it had
been so included." Thus, the court held
that because section 3564.1 was not en-
acted by a vote of two-thirds of each
house or by the voters, as required by
the Political Reform Act, it is invalid
and of no force or effect.
Szkorla v. Vecchione,
231 Cal. App. 3d 1541, 283 Cal. Rptr.
219 No. D010412 (June 17, 1991).
MICRA Limit's Tort
Exception Upheld
In this proceeding, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the de-
cision of the San Diego County Supe-
rior Court that a battery verdict against
a surgeon is not subject to a limit on
damages.
Helen Szkorla sued Dr. Thomas
Vecchione, a plastic surgeon, after he
performed the third of three breast re-
duction surgeries on her in May 1982.
The jury returned special verdicts against
Dr. Vecchione on theories of profes-
sional negligence, lack of informed con-
sent, and battery. The jury awarded
Szkorla $600,000 in general damages
for pain and suffering and $17,430 in
special damages for the cost of future
medical care. Dr. Vecchione appealed,
contending, among other things, that
Civil Code section 3333.2, one of the
provisions of the Medical Injury Coin-
pensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA), limits general or non-
economic damages in any case against
a health care provider to $250,000. On
this point, Vecchione was joined in the
appeal by several health care ass-
ociations, including the California Medi-
cal Association, which filed amicus cu-
riae briefs in support of Vecchione's
position.
The Fourth District disagreed, citing
Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 431-
37 (1985), for the proposition that
MICRA statutes apply only to actions
"based upon [the provider's] alleged
professional negligence.... In a non-
MICRA action the plaintiff is not sub-
ject to (1) the $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages (Civ. Code sec-
tion 3333.2) .. " The Fourth District
noted that the Waters court held that in
hybrid actions of this type, where both
viable MICRA (i.e., negligence) and
non-MICRA (e.g., battery) theories are
pursued and recovery could have been
based on the non-MICRA theory,
MICRA limitations would not apply.
The Fourth District further concluded
that the legislature did not intend the
damage cap of section 3333.2 to apply




No. 368220 (Sacramento County
Superior Court).
Governor Wilson's 5% Pay
Cut Challenged
In late September, the Wilson
administration's Department of Person-
nel Administration (DPA) filed this ac-
tion against state Controller Gray Davis,
seeking to enforce Governor Wilson's
order cutting the salaries of 27,000 state
employees who are managers, supervi-
sors, and political appointees by 5%.
On September 23, Davis announced his
refusal to cut the salaries on grounds the
action taken by Wilson and DPA was
illegal. Governor Wilson and DPA Di-
rector David Tirapelle contend that the
cuts will save $35 million or 750 state
jobs over the course of the year. The
court was expected to rule on the
administration's motion for preliminary
injunction on October 9.
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